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I. Introduction
The problem is a familiar one in hundreds of government agencies,
federal, state, and local: the needs of the agency or the demands for
its services exceed the capabilities of permanent staff. Unable or
unwilling to enlarge the staff, an agency often will obtain temporary
appropriations to procure supplementary services from a commer-
cial source.
Such a procurement raises the challenge of devising a contract
that will protect expectations of both the government agency and the
outside contractor. Two conditions inherent in these procurements
rule out classic types of enforceable contracts. First, the quantity of
services needed from the outside source, because it depends upon
demand or other variables, will be unknown and indeterminable
except perhaps within some range estimated from historical data.
Second, the agency has the ability and the desire to perform with its
own staff some but not all of the necessary services.
The lack of precisely quantifiable need obviously rules out a defi-
nite quantity contract. A pure contract for an indefinite quantity
would lack mutuality of consideration and would therefore be unen-
forceable except to the extent it actually is performed; that is, the
*David E. Boelzner is an associate with Wright, Robinson, McCammon, Osthimer
& Tatum, in Richmond, Virginia.
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contractor's fortune would depend entirely upon the whim of the
government agency placing orders.'
The indefinite quantity contract could be made enforceable if the
agency were willing to guarantee the contractor a minimum payment
regardless of actual demand for the services, but this places the risk
of faulty estimating on the agency's budget. In other words, to fur-
nish non-illusory consideration sufficient to create an enforceable
contract and attract bidders, the agency may run the risk of paying
for unnecessary services.
An alternative to the indefinite quantity contract with guaranteed
minimum is the requirements contract, where the agreement to pur-
chase exclusively from one contractor provides the necessary consid-
eration to the contractor and thus reduces or eliminates the need for
any minimum guarantee.2 The classic requirements contract, how-
ever, demands that the agency procure all services of the type
needed from the contractor.3 It thus fails to address the second con-
dition of these supplemental procurements because the agency may
not perform any of the work in-house. 4
II. Limited-Form Requirements Contracts
The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides contracting offi-
cers with a species of agreement that would appear to answer the
need for a hybrid between the indefinite quantity and the require-
ments contract. FAR Clause 52.216-21 defines the scope of work to
be procured from the contractor as "all supplies or services specified
in the Schedule that are required to be purchased by the Govern-
ment activity or activities specified in the Schedule." '5
Boards of Contract Appeals (BCAs) have interpreted this defini-
tion of contract scope as requiring the agency to buy from the con-
tractor all goods or services that the agency cannot provide with its
own capabilities. The BCAs have thus upheld the validity of what they
term "limited-form" requirements contracts, 6 where the exclusive
1. Ralph Constr. Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 727 (1984). Such an agreement,
unenforceable against the government, should likewise be unenforceable by it. But
see Kozac Micro Sys. Inc., GSBCA No. 10519, 91-1 BCA 23,342 (1990), discussed
infra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
2. Brawley v. United States, 96 U.S. 168, 172 (1878); Shader Contractors, Inc.
v. United States, 149 Ct. Cl. 535, 540-43, 276 F.2d 1, 4-6 (1960).
3. Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 761-62, 768 (Cl. Ct. 1982).
4. Ralph Construction, 4 Cl. Ct. at 733.
5. FAR 52.216-21(c).
6. Dynamic Science, Inc., ASBCA No. 29510, 85-1 BCA 17,710 (1984); Export
Packing & Crating Co., ASBCA No. 16133, 73-2 BCA 10,666 (1973).
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promise to buy everything that must be bought serves as the consid-
eration running from the government to the contractor.
Under such a scheme, the contractor will not perform as much
work as it would under a straight requirements contract, where it
must meet all the agency's needs for the particular good or service.
Despite the lower volume, if the government deals in good faith and
the contractor does its homework on the agency's in-house capacity,
the contractor should run no greater risk than under a straight re-
quirements contract. The agency's capacity will be a constant and the
contractor's work volume will still depend directly and exclusively
upon actual need.'
Ill. Limited-Form Requirements Contracts in
the Court of Federal Claims
The Court of Federal Claims, unlike the BCAs, has had considerable
difficulty accepting this hybrid contract. A contractual interpretation
in that court can potentially spell disaster for either the agency or the
contractor. If the contract purports to be for requirements, but
expressly reserves the right of the agency to perform some of the
work in-house, the court may read the agreement as an unenforce-
able contract for an indefinite quantity and the contractor will have
no rights under it. On the other hand, if the contract does not explic-
itly withhold the right of the agency to perform part of the subject
work in-house, but is instead drafted with the "required to be pur-
chased" language of FAR 52.216-21 (Clause 21), a recent decision of
the Court of Federal Claims indicates that the agreement may be
treated as a straight requirements contract, under which any work
done in-house by the agency may constitute a breach by the
government.
A. Ralph Construction
The leading case in the claims court8 articulating the result adverse
to the contractor is Ralph Construction, Inc. v. United States.9 The agen-
cy's situation in Ralph was precisely the common one described
above: it needed supplemental routine maintenance work on mili-
tary housing beyond what it could do with its own resources. The
contract explicitly provided that the quantities to be purchased were
7. See infra discussion of Max Contracting in section III.
8. This term is used to refer to the variously named manifestations of what is
now the Court of Federal Claims.
9. Ralph Construction, 4 Cl. Ct. 727 (1984).
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"not the total requirements of the activity named in the Schedule"
but were "estimates of requirements in excess of the quantities
which such activity may itself furnish within its own capabilities." The
contractor filed suit because the government assigned work in-house
instead of filling all of its maintenance needs from the contractor.
Relying on two earlier claims court cases, Torncello v. United Statesa 0
and Mason v. United States,1 the court started with the proposition
that the contract had to fall into one of three categories: definite
quantity, indefinite quantity, or requirements. Obviously, it was not
the first. The contractor was apparently surprised to learn that the
contract was not under the third category.
The court held that the agreement had "none of the elements
necessary" for a requirements contract, noting that definition of a
contract is a question of law uncontrolled by the parties' labels or
interpretations. Despite the contractual declaration, the stipulation
of the parties, and the manifest understanding of the contracting
officer and other government employees that it was a requirements
contract, the court found it to be an unenforceable indefinite quan-
tity contract. 12
In the court's view, the fatal flaw was that the agency had not pro-
cured, or agreed to procure, all of its maintenance needs from the
contractor, but had retained the right to perform some of the main-
tenance in-house. Because there was no commitment for all needs,
the agreement was merely for an indefinite quantity with no guaran-
teed minimum, and thus unenforceable as a contract under the U.S.
Supreme Court's ruling in Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States.'3
Nash and Cibinic have criticized the analysis in Ralph because it
ignores the question of what the requirements were. All require-
ments beyond what the agency itself could meet were to be satisfied
by Ralph Construction, Inc., and this exclusivity constituted suffi-
cient consideration to support the contractor's promise to perform.' 4
As has already been noted, this exclusivity is the only consideration
for the contractor's obligations in any requirements contract,
whether "straight" or "limited-form." In the former, the risk for the
contractor is that there will be no requirements at all; in the latter
10. Torncello, 681 F.2d 756, 761 (1982).
11. Mason v. United States, 222 Ct. Cl. 436, 444, 615 F.2d 1343, 1347 (1980).
12. Ralph Construction, 4 Cl. Ct. at 731.
13. Willard, Sutherland & Co. v. United States, 262 U.S. 489, 493 (1923) (noth-
ing in the contractual writing "required the government to take, or limited its
demand, to any ascertainable quantity").
14. Nash and Cibinic, FORMATION OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTS, 807 (2d ed.
1986).
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that there will be no requirements exceeding the procuring agency's
in-house capability.
FAR Clause 21 appears to accomplish exactly what Professors Nash
and Cibinic saw in Ralph, a definition of requirements in terms of the
work within the contract scope that cannot be performed in-house
and therefore must be purchased on contract. BCAs have recognized
the validity and enforceability of the FAR-type agreement in AGS-
Genesys Corp.,'5 Arcon-Pacific Contractors,1 6 and Export Packing & Crating
Co.17 The Armed Services Board recently affirmed this view explicitly
in Operational Service Corp., stating in a footnote that it disagreed with
the holding in Ralph Construction.'8
B. Max Contracting
There is to date no published decision delineating how the United
States Claims Court would treat the FAR-type contract, which lacks
the reservation of in-house work that subverted the parties' inten-
tions in Ralph but nevertheless defines the requirements as those
necessarily purchased outside. However, the court has recently con-
sidered a contract of this type and issued an unpublished decision
suggesting the court is not prepared to acknowledge the limited-
form type of contract, even as effectuated by FAR Clause 21. In con-
trast to the adverse result for the contractor in Ralph, however, the
government was thwarted in Max Contracting, Inc. v. United States.19
Max Contracting entered into an agreement with the National
Gallery of Art under which Max would provide painting and finish-
ing services for a number of temporary exhibitions scheduled to
occur at the gallery. The gallery made no express reservation of the
right to perform some of the work on these exhibitions with its own
painters, but the contract included FAR Clause 21. Midway through
15. AGS-Genesys Corp., ASBCA No. 35302, 89-2 BCA 21,702 (1989).
16. Arcon-Pacific Contractors, ASBCA No. 25057, 82-2 BCA 1 15,838 (1982).
17. Export Packing & Crating Co., ASBCA No. 16133, 73-2 BCA 10,066 (1973).
18. Operational Service Corp., ASBCA No. 37059 et al., 93-3 BCA 26,190 (1993).
In Modern Systems Tech. Corp. v. United States, 979 F.2d 200 (Fed. Cir. 1992),
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a Claims Court decision, 24 Cl. Ct.
360, 11 FPD 1 (1992), and adopted the Claims Court's opinion, which contained
the comment that in Ralph the absence of a requirement that the government
order all of its needs from the contractor rendered the agreement unenforceable.
The board in Operational stated that it did not regard the Federal Circuit's affir-
mance of Modern Systems as an adoption of the dicta regarding Ralph (or, presum-
ably, of Ralph's position on this question). Operational Service Corp., ASBCA No.
37059 et aL, note 1. Modern Systems did not involve a contract under FAR Clause
21 and the comment sheds no light on how the Court of Federal Claims will deal
with these agreements.
19. No. 92-10C (April 28, 1993). Max Contracting v. United States, No. 92-IOC
(Cl. Ct. April 28, 1993).
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the contract, the gallery obtained authorization to hire an additional
full-time painter/finisher. It hired Max's foreman, who subsequently
worked on some temporary exhibitions that were the subject of
Max's contract. The agency did not reduce orders from Max; in fact,
Max's work actually increased toward the end of the contract. Max
sued, however, for the additional profits it would have earned had it
been assigned the work that was performed by the foreman after the
gallery hired him.
The government argued first, under the authority of Ralph Con-
struction, that the contract was not for requirements but rather for an
indefinite quantity. Because the contract specified a core crew to be
available at all times, the government contended that there was a
guaranteed minimum sufficient to render the agreement enforce-
able. Second, the government argued that gallery painters had
throughout the contract term worked alongside the Max crew on the
temporary exhibitions, and nothing in the contract prevented this
practice. In other words, if it was a requirements contract, it was of
the limited form.
The court rejected both contentions, and in the process cast con-
siderable doubt on the validity of limited-form requirements con-
tracts. The opinion in Ralph, the court said, had "analyzed a 'limited-
form' contract and found that 'the unfettered right of the
government to perform work in-house renders the contract unen-
forceable because of the lack of mutuality of consideration.' "20 Max
was distinguishable from Ralph, however, in that the National Gallery
had not expressly reserved the right to perform work in-house. The
court regarded this point as significant:
[M]any valid requirements contracts do not expressly forbid the buyer from
filling its own needs. See Brawley, 96 U.S. at 169; Inland Container, Inc. v. United
States, 206 Ct. Cl. 478, 484-85 (1975); Shader, 149 Ct. Cl. at 540. However, this
does not mean that buyers are free to supply their own needs. As stated in
Shader, under a requirements contract, "[t]he other party implicitly promises
that he will obtain his required goods or services from the first party exclu-
sively." (emphasis added [by Court of Federal Claims]) 149 Ct. Cl. at 540.
Therefore, it is implicit in a valid requirements contract that the buyer must
not supply its service requirements with other labor.2'
Counsel for Max had invited the court to seize the distinction
between the two contracts-Ralph's express provision for in-house
work versus Max's definition of requirements in terms of the needs
20. Slip op. at 6. The court in Ralph did not employ the term "limited form"
and did not discuss this species of contract as treated by the Boards of Contract
Appeals.
21. Slip op. at 6-7.
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beyond agency capability-as an opportunity to embrace the limited-
form type of contract as set forth in the FAR without disturbing the
holding in Ralph.2 2 The court acknowledged that the BCAs have
found adequate mutual consideration in the FAR-type of contract,2 3
but saw no need to adopt this view itself.
Instead, the court focused on the same distinguishing feature, the
Max contract's lack of explicit retention of in-house work, but
reached a result unanticipated by either of the contracting parties;
for although there was disagreement about the parties' expectations
regarding in-house work, the parties agreed that as written the con-
tract did not preclude the gallery from doing some of the work in-
house. The court rejected the parties' understanding and, noting
that the only term possibly open to interpretation was requirements,
said: "Case law is well-settled that in a valid requirements contract
the term 'requirements' means 'all such requirements as do
develop.' "24 The court held that on its plain language, the Max con-
tract was for straight requirements.
The inescapable conclusion from this language in the context of
the court's decision of Ralph Construction is that performance of any
of the contract work by the gallery's painting staff would have been
impermissible under this FAR-type contract. To the extent the
unpublished opinion in Max represents the present view of the
Court of Federal Claims, it indicates that the analysis of Ralph, partic-
ularly the latter's rigid classification of contract types, retains its valid-
ity, and the limited-form requirements contract, even as drafted in
the FAR, will not be recognized in that court.
As shown above, the effects of this doctrine on the parties' inten-
tions have been difficult to predict. In Ralph, the contractor unex-
pectedly found itself with no enforceable promise of work from the
government beyond what had actually been bestowed. In Max, the
government argued that the National Gallery's performance of in-
house work from the inception of the contract indicated that there
had been no breach when the gallery hired Max's foreman,25 only to
22. The ASBCA relies on this difference in language as the basis for differing
levels of discretion afforded an agency in determining its requirements. See infra
discussion in notes 33-40.
23. Slip op., n.3.
24. Slip op. at 7 (citations omitted).
25. The argument was that the foreman hired away from Max had succeeded
one of the National Gallery's staff painters already assigned to the contract work,
and the gallery painter had then simply returned to his heretofore neglected reg-
ular duties.
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learn that in the court's view all such in-house performance would
constitute breach of what was a straight requirements contract.26
As noted at the outset of this article, the limited-form agreement
serves a useful function for hard-pressed government agencies with
inadequate resources that they may wish to supplement through pri-
vate-sector vendors. Max is an unpublished decision, and although its
reasoning seems to affirm the Ralph analysis of these contracts, it
does not explicitly decide that limited-form contracts cannot under
any circumstances be judicially condoned. It is hoped that the Court
of Federal Claims will reach the conclusion of the BCAs, i.e., this sort
of hybrid contract meets a genuine commercial need and rests on no
skimpier consideration than does a straight requirements contract if
the contractor exercises diligence and the government deals in good
faith. 27
IV. The Government's Obligation
What the government's good faith obligation entails has not always
been made clear in the BCA jurisprudence upholding limited-form
contracts. In the cases of Henry Angelo & Sons, Inc.,28 and Maya Transit
Co.,29 the BCAs held it to be improper for the agency to redistribute
its own capabilities to reduce orders to the contractor. Max Contrac-
ting's claim was based on this principle of non-diversion of contract
work in-house, alleging that the National Gallery had impermissibly
augmented or reallocated its workforce to reduce requirements to
be purchased.
26. Max was settled before any ultimate resolution of the issue of breach and
its extent.
27. It is noteworthy that a Court of Claims decision, Franklin Co. v. United
States, 381 F.2d 416 (1967), acknowledged a limited type requirements contract
some six years before the ASBCA first coined the term "limited form requirements
contract" in Export Packing & Crating Co., ASBCA 16133, 73-2 BCA 10,066 (1973).
In Franklin, the court found that the government had contracted to assign portions
of a technical manual preparation program to each of two contractors, allocated
based on the customary tasks performed at each of two Army depots. The court
held this arrangement enforceable:
The Government was obligated to make a good faith effort to assign to Franklin
those aspects of the technical manual program which were customarily given to
the Marion Depot. Franklin, in turn, agreed to do this assigned work at specified
fees. Neither party was wholly at large. The mutual undertakings formed a lim-
ited type of requirements compact sanctioned at law.
381 F.2d at 420 (citations omitted).
28. Henry Angelo & Sons, Inc., ASBCA No. 15082, 72-1 BCA 9356 (1972).
29 . Maya Transit Co., ASBCA No. 20186, 75-2 BCA 11,552 (1975).
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On the other hand, the opinion in Arcon-Pacific Contractor3 states
that where the contract specified acquisition from the contractor of
"all services required to be purchased," the Army "had discretion to
determine what painting was 'required to be purchased' " outside
the agency and was permitted to perform work in-house with troop
labor. The board's holding in the case, however, was narrower than
its dicta; the Army was held liable for work diverted to another con-
tractor but not for work it failed to order because of lack of funding.
The question of the government simply choosing to do the work
itself rather than order from the contractor was not an issue.
Similar to the statement in Arcon-Pacific are dicta in Dynamic Science,
characterizing the government's obligation under a limited form
contract as purchasing all requirements it "did not choose to meet
from its own capabilities." 3' Other cases cited 32 as authority for an
agency's unfettered discretion to change its requirements by internal
manipulation are Export Packing & Crating Co., in which the board
approved an agency's decision to assign work to civilian employees of
the agency rather than order under the contract;33 Hilton's Cleaners,
Inc.,3 4 in which a change in military recruiting and uniform issuance
policies, which decreased contract orders, was held permissible; and
AGS-Genesys Corp.,35 which states that the government is required only
to order its actual needs and estimate its requirements in good faith
and with due care.
It is doubtful that this line of cases stands for the proposition that
a government agency has discretion under a FAR-type contract to
alter its in-house capabilities from what they were at the inception of
the contract and thereby reduce its requirements of the contractor.
If so, the government's promise to procure all of its outside require-
ments from the contractor becomes illusory, because the require-
ments can be manipulated to thwart the contractor's expectations.
By way of illustration, consider again the agreement in Max Con-
tracting. Assuming the contract between Max and the National Gal-
lery was for limited requirements, and assuming Max had calculated
its bid based on some research into the gallery's in-house capability
30. Supra note 16, at 78,516. Arcon-Pacific Contractors, ASBCA No. 25057, 82-2
BCA 78,516 (1982).
31. Supra note 6, at 88,383.
32. See Kozac Micro Systems, GSBCA No. 10519, 91-1 BCA 23,342 (1990).
33. Supra note 6. A plausible reading of this case is that the disputed work was
not clearly part of the requirements included in the contract; thus, the decision
does not stand for the agency's right to withhold work orders by mere choice.
34. Hilton Cleaners, Inc., ASBCA No. 18213, 74-1 BCA 10,433 (1974).
35. Supra note 15.
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at the time of the solicitation, could Max rely on that capability
remaining unchanged? Or was the gallery free to decrease its re-
quirements by augmenting its in-house staff by adding a full-time
painter?
The BCA cases tie the amount of discretion the government has in
placing orders to the language of the purchase requirement in the
contract, whether it is a FAR-type specification of all goods or services
"required to be purchased" or an express allocation of all goods or
services "in excess of the agency's own capacity." Under the latter
language the agency has less discretion than under the former,3 6 and
the answer to the question posed above is clear. When the contract is
for the excess above the agency's capabilities, the boards have inter-
preted "capabilities" to mean those existing at the time of award,
and have held that decreases in purchase requirements caused by
subsequent government expansion of its capabilities are compensa-
ble, either as a contract change or a partial termination for conven-
ience.3 7 The ASBCA's opinion in Dynamic Science says explicitly that
"the government was precluded from expanding its capabilities dur-
ing contract performance at the expense of the contractor.' '38
Less clear is exactly how much discretion the government has
under the FAR "required to be purchased" definition of require-
ments. As seen above, despite broad dicta in Arcon-Pacific, the holding
in that case does not rely on the government's supposed discretion,
if"discretion" is defined as "the power of free decision" or "individ-
ual choice or judgment. ' 39 The contractor in Arcon had understood
from the beginning that, while much painting was needed on the
Army base, how much actually got done would depend on funding
levels. The fact that the Army did not obtain as much funding as the
work estimates had anticipated did not make the reduction in deliv-
ery orders a discretionary act on the part of the government.
The other cases cited as authority for the enlarged discretion of
the government under FAR-type "required to be purchased" con-
tracts are similarly uninstructive on this point. AGS-Genesys Corp.40
involved no volitional decision by the government to reduce its
36. Kozac Micro Systems, GSBCA No. 10519, 91-1 BCA 23,342 at 117,058.
37. Arcon-Pacifit ASBCA No. 25057, 82-2 BCA 1 15,838 at 78,517 (1982); Kozac,
at 117,058; Maya Transit, ASBCA No. 20186, 72-2 BCA 11,552 (1975); Henry
Angelo, ASBCA No. 15082, 72-1 BCA 9356 (1972). By contrast, in the Court of
Federal Claims, pursuant to Ralph Construction, a contract with this limitation is an
unenforceable indefinite quantity contract.
38. Supra note 6, at 88,383.
39. See WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1986).
40. Supra note 15.
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requirements. Indeed, the board had no evidence before it showing
why no requirements arose during the contract term in issue. The
holding of Export Packing, as discussed above, 4' also does not cite
agency discretion as grounds for denying the contractor's appeal.
The reduced requirements in Hilton's Cleaners resulted from a
change in the government's recruit training, which reduced the flow
of recruits needing alterations of their uniforms under the appel-
lant's tailoring contract. In some sense this change in military policy
could be termed discretionary, but the board's opinion does not fas-
ten on this discretion as the primary ground of decision. It relies on
cases absolving the government of liability for requirements changes
arising from the conduct of peculiarly military affairs, such as the exi-
gencies of training in response to the Vietnam conflict.
Kozac Micro Systems, Inc., the General Services Board (GSBCA) case
that most clearly delineates the different levels of permissible agency
discretion, depending upon the wording of the requirements clause,
presents the one instance where the absolute discretion of the pro-
curing agency is the basis for decision. Under a contract for auditing
services, the GSA had promised to forward for financial audit only
such bills as GSA deemed "available for audit" and explicitly
retained the right to perform audits in-house to the extent it chose
to do so. Although the GSBCA expressed dismay that either party
would choose to enter into such a risky contract, 42 it upheld the
agency discretion, declaring in a footnote that the contract was a lim-
ited-form requirements contract.
The board's declaration was incorrect. Although the agreement
referred to procuring "such bona-fide needs as may arise," the
retention of an absolute right to screen and select which bills, if any,
would be sent out for audit under the contract rendered the promise
to purchase the agency's needs illusory. The government had no
obligation to procure its actual requirements, as the board rightly
perceived. The agency could perform as much work in-house as it
chose, irrespective of its capabilities at the time of contracting. The
contract was actually one for an indefinite quantity without a guar-
anteed minimum and was thus unenforceable except to the extent
actually performed, which is what the board ruled, in effect though
not in its terms.43
41. See supra note 33.
42. The board observed: "Why either party would choose to enter into a con-
tract which includes these clauses is beyond us." 91-1 BCA 23,342 at 117,059.
43. The Comptroller General followed an approach similar to Kozads in Tucson
Mobilephone, Inc., B-247685, 92-1 CPD 487 (1992). The bid protester had argued
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As the foregoing illustrates, the greater discretion purportedly
afforded the agency by the "required to be purchased" language, as
compared to the "in excess of agency capacity" provision, may be
largely fictitious. It is suggested here that the board's focus on the
peculiar phrasing of the requirements clause is artificial, and not par-
ticularly useful. There is no pertinent semantic difference between a
requirement to purchase all services in excess of the agency's in-
house capacity, and one to buy all services that are required to be
purchased. 4 More precisely, the former is a subset of the latter.
There could be services within the agency's capacity that for some
other reason are to be procured outside anyway, and thus are
"required to be purchased" from the contractor.
The broader point is that absolute agency discretion to choose at
will what is procured and performed in-house renders nugatory a
contractual promise to purchase requirements, as was the case in
Kozac. To hold that the "required to be purchased" language con-
fers this degree of discretion is to invalidate the FAR Clause 21-type
contract by converting it, as the Ralph Construction court would, to
what is in effect an unenforceable indefinite quantity contract with
no minimum guarantee. As has been seen, despite broad dicta that
would suggest such analysis, the decisions of the Armed Services
Board have explicitly rejected the reasoning of Ralph.45
Instead, the ASBCA cases speak in terms of good or bad faith on
the part of the government.46 This distinction offers little more help
than does the differentiation between the wording of the require-
ments definition just discussed, since the cases do not define or illu-
minate the meaning of these terms. Does bad faith require an intent
that a provision reserving to the government the right to perform certain work
"when deemed necessary" by the agency was inconsistent with a requirements
contract. The Comptroller disagreed, finding nothing "inconsistent with the
nature of the contract" in such a provision. Under the analysis in this article this
conclusion is wrong, since the power to deem or not to deem renders the promise
to purchase requirements illusory and is clearly inconsistent with it. It must be
noted, however, that the agency had interpreted the provision to permit in-house
work where no contractor personnel were available or where the repair was easily
accomplished with available in-house equipment. This interpretation essentially
converted the "when deemed necessary" option into a "required to be pur-
chased" provision, which may account for the Comptroller's approbation.
44. This point is illustrated by Export Packing, ASBCA No. 16133, 73-2 BCA
10,066 (1973), in which the ASBCA held that the "required to be purchased"
language obligated the government to order only its purchase requirements, not
those it could accomplish with its own personnel.
45. See Dynamic Science, ASBCA No. 29510, 85-1 BCA 17,710 at 88,383 (1984),
noting that the board has taken a view contrary to that of Ralph Construction.
46. See, e.g., Hilton Cleaners, ASBCA No. 18213, 74-1 BCA 10,433 (1974); Arcon-
Pacific, ASBCA No. 25057, 82-2 BCA 15,838 at 78,516 (1982); Henry Angelo,
ASBCA No. 15082, 72-1 BCA 9356 (1972).
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to injure the contractor or merely the estimating of requirements
without due diligence? Is it bad faith to fail to disclose possible
changes in policy that could adversely affect the contract? Language
in Hilton and Arcon-Pacific indicates that a governmental decision
made for a good reason, military or even economic, precludes a find-
ing of bad faith. On the other hand, the Army's election to perform
painting with government personnel because it could be done more
cheaply was ruled lack of good faith in Henry Angelo.
Policy arguments militate in divergent directions on this question,
a problem that may account for disparate results before the same
BCA. The law should promote efficient use of resources, especially
when one party is, in effect, the public. Government agencies should
be encouraged to implement cost savings by finding the least expen-
sive manner for delivering agency services. Where the contractor has
voluntarily agreed to run the risk of decreased requirements, the
conservation of public funds by diverting more work in-house may
appear to be a perfectly justifiable and, therefore, a "good faith"
basis for reducing those requirements.
On the other hand, a diligent contractor predicts its revenue and
profit based on the agency's good faith estimate of the volume of
work and on the agency's apparent capacity to perform a portion of
it. This calculus does not include the prospect of the agency ignoring
its routine maintenance chores in order to accomplish more urgent
work that would otherwise be purchased from the contractor. Nor
does it include the agency's unexpectedly augmenting its internal
workforce to increase its capacity. If the solicitation does not disclose
the risk of the agency thus manipulating its internal resources, then
these are risks the contractor has not knowingly assumed. Indeed,
the contractor's preparation, if thorough enough to have researched
the agency's capacity, has specifically aimed to avoid these risks.
These observations indicate the proper focus on analysis of lim-
ited-form requirements contracts. There is risk associated with any
type of contract, owing to impossibility, mistake, impracticability,
force majeure, and the like. A requirements contract entails greater
risk, because the quantum of work is unknown and only roughly pre-
dictable. This risk is presumably accounted for in the contract price.
Corbin on Contracts, section 156, contains the following observation
about all requirements contracts:
Much is left to the judgment of the promisor, even to his will and desire; but
not everything is thus left. The promise contains one very definite element
that specifically limits the promisor's liberty of future action; he definitely
promises that he will buy of no one else.
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The BCA's treatment of the good faith obligation of the government
suggests that, in the practical reality of modern government con-
tracts, pace Corbin, exclusivity alone is not sufficient. The viability of
the exclusive purchase obligation as consideration for an agreement
depends on the contractor having a fair opportunity to evaluate the
likelihood of requirements and their quantum. In view of the
immense presence and predominance of the government as pur-
chaser, and the unequal bargaining power between the government
and contractors, it is sound policy to seek to prevent formation of
illusory contracts where the contractor's fortunes depend on the
caprice of bureaucrats.
Such a policy suggests that the risk assumed by a contractor in a
limited-form requirements contract should be only the risk of un-
foreseeable events that would reduce or negate the value of the con-
tract. Given that this risk is inherently high in requirements
contracts, the contractor should not be asked to assume additional
risks that are known or knowable by the government.
The government should have two duties in this regard. The first is
to disclose to prospective contractors both (1) its good faith estimate
of its future requirements, based upon available historical data and
clear project definition; and (2) all known or reasonably identifiable
contingencies that could significantly reduce requirements. For a
prospective contractor fairly to rely upon this disclosure entails the
second government obligation, that it eschew any volitional act that
would diminish its requirements under the contract.
Applying this analytical scheme to some of the cases discussed
above reveals that it accurately accounts for the decisions of the
boards. The second obligation explains the results in Henry Angelo,
Maya Transit, and other cases where the agency augmented its in-
house capacity or otherwise diverted requirements to the detriment
of the contractor. The opposite judicial result, where the govern-
ment is not held liable for requirements reduced because of events
beyond the promisor's control, is likewise consistent, since the
reduction is not volitional. The disclosure obligation explains the
result in Arcon-Pacific, where the availability vel non of sufficient fund-
ing was a known and disclosed contingency from the beginning, and
thus something the contractor should have factored into its evalua-
tion and bid.
The cases of Max Contracting and Hilton Cleaners illustrate the
advantage of this risk allocation analysis over good and bad faith
analysis in guiding the relevant factual inquiry. In Max, the gallery
obtained approval during the contract term for a full-time position it
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had sought for some time. Although it did not know when (or if)
approval would be obtained, it had prepared a New Position Descrip-
tion in the same month the contract began, so it knew of the possi-
bility. If it also knew that the new person, if obtained, would be
assigned to the contract work, this was a risk of reduced require-
ments that should have been made known to Max.
This inquiry, whether the contingency was known or reasonably
knowable, lacks the moral overtones of a good faith analysis and pro-
vides a useful and policy-driven basis for discriminating among the
various government actions that can impair requirements contracts.
On this basis, the board in Hilton would have sought to learn whether
the changes in military recruiting that signalled a downturn in Hil-
ton's fortunes resulted from the vicissitudes of war or from policy
changes for convenience. If the government had a choice of what it
would do, and elected for its convenience to divert work elsewhere,
then Hilton should have been compensated in some fashion.
One of the goals of the federal procurement system, as reflected in
the FAR's delineation of the contracting officer's duties, is to
"ensure that contractors receive impartial, fair, and equitable treat-
ment." 47 In a requirements contract, the contractor is already under-
taking the risk inherent in the uncertainty of the agency's require-
ments. If the government activity is regular, routine, and historically
predictable, this risk may be minimal; if the activity is relatively new,
extraordinary, or unpredictable, the risk of the unknowable future
may be considerable. Either way, undisclosed intentions or un-
planned acts of the government enlarge the range of the unknow-
able and expand the risk beyond anything reasonably anticipated by
the contractor.
The better policy appears to be to ask the government to bear the
risk of unanticipated, but nevertheless volitional, adjustments of
requirements by the government.48 Even if such adjustments are
made to pursue efficiency, seizing an opportunity to perform work
in-house now that the capability exists, to permit adjustments for this
reason would be to inject an unnecessary additional element of
uncertainty into requirements contracts. Apart from the unfairness
to contractors, this added risk, if routinely imposed, would eventually
be reflected in bid adjustments to the government's disadvantage.
Or, conversely, if contractors could rely on the law's consistently pro-
47. FAR 1.602-2(b).
48. This parallels the concept of the government opting to terminate a con-
tractor for convenience, where it makes economic sense to do so.
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tecting them from this risk, the government should benefit through
lower bids.
V. Conclusion
Efficiency and flexibility in public contracting are ill served by the
Court of Federal Claims' apparent refusal to acknowledge the lim-
ited form requirements contract. This species of agreement can be a
legitimate enforceable mechanism for delineating the duties and
allocating the risks of the contracting parties in situations where the
agency has inadequate in-house capabilities it wishes to supplement.
Limited form contracts, regardless of their precise wording,
should be interpreted to require the government to disclose to pro-
spective contractors all information essential to a rational calculation
and evaluation of risk, and to refrain from altering that risk calculus
during the term of the contract by undertaking deliberate manipu-
lations of agency requirements. Such an interpretation best recon-
ciles the public policies of fiscal efficiency and of straightforward
dealing between government and its contractors.
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